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1, Introduction 
Large corporations which are government-owned are the subject of continuing 
debate, especially with respect to their assumed inferior performance and also 
with respect to the privatization plans of West European governments 1, Corpo-
rations that are totally owned by government (or dominantly influenced by the 
government share of equity) represent a special form of ownership of the firm 
which has potential specific consequences for the behavior of the firm. On the 
basis of the theory of property rights 2 and competition theory 3 the economic 
consequences of this form of ownership may be analyzed. 
Section 2 summarizes the theoretical arguments that are transformed into 
specific hypotheses in Section 3. In order to investigate the explanatory power 
of the theory, in Section 4 the hypotheses are tested with firm-specific empirical 
data derived from the "Fortune 500 - Outside the US". Thus, it is possible to 
compare privately-owned and government-owned industrial corporations of 
six industrial nations on a broad data basis 4. It must be noted that typical 
corporations from the public service sector, such as railways, PTT, broadcast-
ing, public utilities, hospitals etc. are not included in the sample as this type of 
public firm very often operates in regulated markets 5. The analysis, therefore, 
1 See e.g. Wirtschaftswoche [1985]; BUTLER [1986], SLAVICH [1987]. 
2 E.g. ALCHIAN [1965]; DEMSETZ [1967]; ALCHIAN and DEMSETZ [1973]; PICOT [1981]; 
KAULMANN [1987a]. 
3 E.g. ALCHIAN [1969]; PICOT [1984]; BOBEL [1984]. 
4 This study is an elaboration of a previous study conducted by the authors (PICOT and 
KAULMANN [1985]). The present study employs a longer time frame (1975-1984) than in 
the previous study (1978-1982). The conclusions of the present study confirm the previ-
ous findings. 
5 An overview of the empirical efficiency differences between state and private produc-
tion is given in BoRCHERDING, POMMEREHNE, and SCHNEIDER [1982]. These authors sum-
marize 48 empirical studies, three of which show lower costs for state production, five do 
not exhibit significant differences and 40 found lower performance levels in state produc-
tion as compared to private production. 
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is confined to corporations that act in unregulated markets and that are ex-
posed to national and international competition 6. The study aims at a micro-
economic comparison, in order to ascertain whether there are systematic differ-
ences in performance between the two groups. 
The investigation assumes that government-owned corporations orient their 
behavior towards monetary and market-oriented goals that are similar to those 
of their private competitors. Thus, as far as differences in performance can be 
traced, they can be attributed - ceteris paribus - to the specific property rights 
constellation. Of course it is very difficult to find out what the objectives of 
government-owned large corporations are. Even if a majority of government-
owned industrial corporations pursued specific objectives that are different 
from those of their private competitors (e.g. employment policy, structural 
policy), possible differences in performance could be an indicator of the "price" 
that has to be paid for the different goal priority. As to what extent this "price" 
is caused by the specific goal orientation and/or by changing efficiency behavior 
induced by the property right structures is to be discussed later in the paper. 
In the long run, owing to restrictions in public expenditure, government-
owned large industrial corporations that compete in national and international 
markets must observe objectives that promote efficiency in production and 
sales, otherwise they cannot survive in a competitive world. The question, howev-
er, is whether government-owned industrial corporations have similar chances 
when pursuing such efficiency objectives as have their private competitors. 
2. Property Rights Theory and the Performance of Government-owned 
and Privately-owned Industrial Corporations 
The implications of property rights theory for the theory of the firm have been 
elaborated in detail elsewhere 7. It has been shown that, from the standpoint of 
property rights theory, a public stock company (a so-called manager-controlled 
corporation) can be seen as an efficient alternative to an owner-controlled 
company. The division of ownership and control does not necessarily lead to 
a loss of performance; indeed, if competition in capital markets, markets for 
final goods and markets for managers is sufficient, no significant difference in 
performance between owner-controlled and manager-controlled companies 
can be found. The competitive forces in the above-mentioned markets serve as 
a surrogate for owner control 8. At the same time the public stock company is 
6 For an assesment of this kind of sampling see BLANKART [1987, 53f.]. 
7 E.g. ALCHIAN [1965]; DEMSETZ [1967]; ALCHlAN and DEMSETZ [1973]; PICOT [1981]; 
TIETZEL [1981]; MEYER [1983]; GAFGEN [1984]; PICOT and MICHAELIS [1984]; KAULMANN 
[1987a]. 
8 E.g. ALCHlAN [1969]; FURUBOTN and PmOVICH [1972, 1149 fT.]; RIDDER-AAB [1980, 
70 fT.]; PIcOT [1981]; DE ALESSI [1983,73 fT.]; DEMSETZ [1983,387 fT.]; LEIPOW [1983, 73 ff.]; 
ALCHIAN [1984]; PICOT and MICHAELIS [1984]; KAULMANN [1987 a, 33 fT.]. 
300 Arnold Picot and Thomas Kaulmann J][]'ITIE 
enabled to raise the necessary capital in order to finance the growth of the 
corporation. Looking at the theoretical arguments as well as at the empirical 
studies of recent years 9, it can be concluded that manager-controlled and 
owner-controlled corporations form a relatively homogeneous group that can 
serve as a control group (private ownership) in a comparative investigation with 
government-owned corporations. It is necessary, however, to explore the struc-
ture of property rights of government-owned corporations in greater detail. 
The main property rights that influence the behavior of government-owned 
corporations are allocated as follows: the right to coordinate (to acquire and 
to allocate) resources is mainly in the hands of the managers of these corpora-
tions; the right to appropriation of profits (and losses) and the right to capital-
ization (to transfer all property rights to new owners) is in the hands of the 
government. Therefore, at first glance an attenuation of property rights can be 
concluded. In contrast to the group of privately-owned corporations where 
competitive market forces substitute for the division of property rights, in the 
government-owned case incentives for control on the side of the owners are 
much weaker; neither politicians nor the citizens that are represented by the 
government are directly affected by the appropriation of profits or losses by the 
government. The wealth of a private owner, however, is directly changed by 
losses incurred or profits earned by his firm. This is not the case for a politician 
who acts as an agent for the government nor for a citizen whose government 
owns a company. This indicates that government-owned corporations poten-
tially offer many more degrees offreedom for the management of those compa-
nies than in the case of privately-owned companies. The larger room for discre-
tion in government-owned corporations can be exploited by managers for other 
than economic goals. Incentives for control of management behavior on the 
side of the owners are much lower than in the case of privately-owned corpo-
rations. 
The monitoring effects of the markets for final products, for capital and for 
managers are less strong than in the case of private corporations. When a 
government-owned corporation does not pursue an effective business strategy, 
its economic position in final product markets is affected in the same way as in 
the case of privately-owned corporations. However, the consequences for dis-
cretionary behavior of the managers are different. The reason can be found in 
a lack of market signaling power if the corporation is owned by government: 
the final owners (citizens) cannot decide to sell their shares when the corpora-
9 The debate ,on managerialism was triggered by BERLE and MEANS [19321; a recent 
assessment of thiS' debate is given in Journal o/law and Economics, vo!. 26, no. 2,1983. It 
is questionable whether differences in efficiency between manager-controlled and owner-
controlled corporations can be convincingly observed in reality, as is shown in contribu-
tions of the mentioned issue of Journal 0/ law and Economics as well as in a recent study 
of KAULMANN [1987b]. The latter publication shows that for 24 recent empirical studies 
only 7 find a higher profitability of owner-controlled companies. All the 11 studies carried 
out since 1976 do not show differences in profitability between the two groups. 
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tion perfonns poorly. The same is true for politicians as agents of the final 
owners. Even if there is a private minority ownership in a government-owned 
company, the signaling of the capital market is weakened, since the financing 
of government-owned corporations differs from that of privately-owned corpo-
rations owing to the trust in the liquidity of state ownership in industrialized 
countries. In other words, there is the expectation that the government will 
come to the financial aid of a government-owned enterprise which faces severe 
financial difficulties - thus weakening the monitoring effects of the capital 
market. 
In the world of privately-owned corporations the threat of takeover of weak-
ly perfonning corporations by third parties plays an important role for their 
efficient behavior. This threat does not exist in the case of government-owned 
corporations, as the privatization of such corporations depends not only on 
economic criteria but as well on diverse political factors. Hence, a declining 
level of efficiency will not increase the probability of a takeover and/or the 
probability of an exchange of management. 
Of course, in government-owned corporations too there is some competition 
for managerial positions. However, the competitive forces of the market for 
managers are different and weaker than in privately-owned corporations. As 
the control by politicians and owners is relatively weak and the pressure of the 
capital and final goods markets is not very strong, managers of government-
owned corporations will have more possibilities of hiring staff who are loyal to 
them and who at the same time do not necessarily show high perfonnance rates. 
Thus potential internal competition for managerial positions becomes weaker, 
especially given that the vertical control of managers by their subordinates is 
lessened 10. As a result, the market for managers does not monitor the manage-
ment behavior of government-owned corporations to the same extent as in the 
case of privately-owned corporations; consequently, managers of government-
owned corporations can pursue personal goals to a larger extent. 
It is difficult to assess the difference in pecuniary incentive structures between 
privately- and government-owned corporations. It could be argued that the 
owners of a private corporation have higher motivation than the government 
to implement useful pecuniary incentive structures for the management. One of 
the very few empirical investigations in this field was undertaken by BOBEL and 
DIRRHEIMER [1984]. They found that only for two years of a 12-year sample 
was the share of the state ownership a significant influence on the remuneration 
of management - and even then the significance was not strong. Therefore, 
pecuniary incentives are more or less the same for managers in government- and 
in privately-owned corporations. 
10 E.g. DE ALESSI [1974, 648]. 
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3. Hypotheses 
Owing to greater scope for discretionary behavior, to lower incentives for 
control by politicians/owners and to weaker surrogates for private ownership, 
the following hypothesis may be formulated: 
H 1: Government-owned corporations show lower levels of productivity than 
privately-owned corporations. 
As relatively more input is necessary for government-owned corporations to 
fulfill their tasks, profits of these corporations will be lower: 
H 2: Government-owned corporations show lower rates of return than privately-
owned corporations. 
Owing to weaker signaling of capital markets for government-owned corpo-
rations and owing to different financing behavior, we postulate: 
H 3: The ratio of shareholders' equity to total assets is lower in government-
owned corporations than in privately-owned corporations. 
With reference to the control problems in government-owned corporations 
and the findings of WILL lAM SON and JACQUEMIN and DEGHELLINCK 12 on cor-
relation between size of the firm and profit, we conclude that an increase in firm 
size leads to a smaller increase in profits in the case of government-owned 
corporations than in the case of private corporations. The reason is that a larger 
number of employees leads to increased monitoring and control problems 
which are handled more efficiently by private firms. 
H 4: The increase in the size of firms leads to a smaller increase in profits in the 
case of government-owned corporations than in the case of private corporations. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Source of Data and Operationaliation of Variables 
Fortune's "The Foreign 500" for the years 1975-1984 form the data base for this 
investigation 13. Thus, the sample includes only large industrial companies. The 
data cover six western industrial nations (excluding USA and Japan) and fifteen 
12 E.g. WrLLIAMsoN [1967], JACQUEMIN and DEGHELLNICK [1980]. 
13 The "Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations outside the 
V.S." is published each year in the August issue of Fortune Magazine. The "Foreign 500" 
list uses accounting concepts and data. There are likely to be differences between econom-
ic and accounting concepts. We assume that these measurement differences are randomly 
distributed and have an expected value of zero. For an appreciation ofthe use of account-
ing data in applied economic investigations, see e.g. FrscHER and McGowAN [1983]; 
BENSTON [1985]; SALAMON [1985]. 
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industries in which government-owned corporations can be observed. The data 
allow us to control for the influence of important conditions (industry, country, 
and size) by statistical methods. Computations are made for a pooled sample 
covering the ten year period, that is, a combination of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal study 14. 
The group of government-owned corporations was formed by those compa-
nies that were indicated in the Fortune List as "government-owned" is. This 
means that the state holds a dominant share, in many cases one hundred percent 
of the company. Each year the qualification for government-owned or private-
ly-owned was made anew, so that a company over the years can appear in both 
groups if in the meantime a nationalization or a privatization has taken place. 
All companies are industrial in the sense that more than fUty percent of the sales 
derived from industrial production and/or mining. 
Size of the corporation was measured by several variables: 
- Sales: 
excluding excise taxes and customs duties; intracompany transactions are ex-
cluded, consolidated subsidiaries of more than fifty percent owned are included. 
Figures are shown in US dollars using an exchange rate that consists of the 
official average rate during each company's fiscal year; all figures in thousands 
of US dollars. 
- Total Assets: 
as at the end of a company's accounting year consolidated and converted into 
thousands of US dollars. 
- Employees: 
relating to those employees that cover the sales figure. 
Depending on the causal relationship under study, the size of a corporation 
is measured in the multivariate statistics by one or other of the measures 
described above. 
14 See Appendices 1 and 2; in the pooled sample each event ail of the variable a of 
company i in the period t represents an observation. The sample was cleaned of some 
extreme cases (not contained in the five sigma-interval). Furthermore, for some observa-
tions specific information was missing, so that the number of cases included may vary 
from one computation to another. 
As to what extent the selection of the largest industrial corporations from the six 
countries and fifteen industries could represent a selection bias with respect to all corpo-
rations cannot be clarified within this contribution. 
An inclusion of Japan (no government-owned large corporations represented), an 
inclusion of industries without government-owned industrial corporations and an inclu-
sion of the other countries of the Fortune 500 List has not changed the significant findings 
of this investigation. 
15 The Fortune List only provides data on whether a corporation is privately- or 
government-owned. Other information is not available concerning the governments' 
participation in government-owned enterprises - such as the creation of incentives to 
reduce agency costs etc. 
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For operationalization of other variables two further figures were listed: 
- Net Income: 
after taxes and extraordinary items (thousands of US dollars). 
- Stockholders Equity: 
minority interest not included; all figures at the end of each company's account-
ing year converted to dollars at the official exchange rate (thousands of US 
dollars). 
With these variables the following indicators for productivity can be de-
duced: 
- Productivity of labor sales 
employees 
- Productivity of capital = 
total assets. 
sales 
As measures for profitability the following ratios were computed: 
- Return on stockholders' equity 
- Return on total assets 
- Return on sales 
net income 
stockholders equity 
net income 
total assets 
net income 
sales. 
To control for special conditions, each company was allocated to an industri-
al classification according to its largest share of sales. A dummy variable was 
defined in order to represent the industry in regression analysis. A similar 
procedure was applied for the country variable 16. 
At first we use univariate analysis based on simple productivity and prof-
itability ratios. This comparison of simple ratios is limited by the failure to take 
into account other influential variables, such as size and industry. The sample 
size is sufficient to enable us to undertake multivariate analysis so that we can 
determine the effect of size, industry and country, on the comparative perfor-
mance of government and private corporations. 
4.2. Univariate Analysis 
A test of H1 on the basis of simple productivity ratios shows that government-
owned companies on average demand higher factor inputs (employees, capital) 
16 A control of the country and industry influence by dummy variables does not seem 
to be problematic because, as statistical analysis shows, multicollinearity that is possible 
in principle (in the form of high standard deviations of the estimated coefficients in the 
regression equations) does not show up. 
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Table 1. 
Average productivity ratios of government-owned and privately-owned 
industrial corporations 1975-84 
Private 
n "" 1602 
140.10 
Sales 
Employees 
•• 
Government 
n = 238 
84.75 
Private 
n = 1576 
1.388 
Sales 
Total Assets 
• • 
Government 
n = 233 
0.9890 
•• 2-tailed t-test of the means leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis with a level of 
significance of IX = 0.Q1. 
than their private counterparts. Thus, the null-hypothesis that both groups 
show similar productivity ratios must be rejected within a 2-tailed Hest 17 
(Table 1). 
Lower productivity ratios of government-owned corporations may imply 
that these corporations show lower rates of return (H2). Average profitability 
ratios prove this assumption (Table 2). 
On the average, government-owned corporations incurred losses whereas 
privately-owned corporations yielded profits (the span of profit reaches from 
minus 3,890 million dollars to plus 1,378 million dollars). The t-test therefore 
shows a high level of significance. 
As can be seen from Table 3, government-owned companies show higher 
measures of size than their private counterparts so the differences outlined 
above could be due to size. Table 3 also shows that government-owned corpo-
rations, according to H3, have a lower ratio of shareholders' equity to total 
assets; again, the influence of size on this univariate result must be taken into 
account. 
Table 2. 
Average profitablity ratios of government-owned and 
privately-owned corporations 1975-84 
Net Income 
Equity 
Private 
n = 1547 
0.0708 
•• 
Government 
n = 213 
- 0.1222 
Private 
n = 1550 
0.0273 
Net Income 
Total Assets 
•• 
Government 
n = 226 
- 0.0206 
Private 
n = 1569 
0.0212 
Net income 
Sales 
•• 
Government 
n = 226 
- 0.0237 
** 2-tailed t-test of the means leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis with a level of 
significance of IX = 0.Q1. 
17 Nonparametric tests produced similar results for each of the hypotheses. 
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Table 3. 
Averages of size variables (sales, total assets, employees) and the ratio of equity 
to total assets for government-owned and privately-owned corporations 1975-84 
Private Government 
Sales 3,119,705 4,631,614 ** 
Total assets 2,566,657 4,791,299 ** 
Employees 45,032 73,597 ** 
Equity 
0.290 0.214 ** 
Total assets 
.. 2-tailed (-test of the means leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis with a level of 
significance of ex = 0.01. 
4.3. Multivariate Analysis 
A linear regression model is the basis for the following multivariate analysis. 
Equations (1) and (2) are related to the test of Ht 
(1) 
meaning: 
SAL/E 
GOV 
ASSET 
LEVER 
NAT 
IND 
U 
SAL/E = ao + a 1 GOV + a2 ASSET + a3 LEVER 
5 14 
+ L bj NA1j + L cKINDk + U; 
j= 1 k= 1 
sales per employee; 
dummy variable for ownership ( = 1, if government-owned; = 0, 
if private); 
total assets; 
the ratio of total stockholder equity to total assets; 
dummy variable for country ( = 1, if corporation i in country j; 
otherwise = 0); 
dummy variable for industries ( = 1, if corporation i in industry 
k, otherwise = 0); 
error term with the usual assumptions (normal distributed, ex-
pected value = 0, constant variance = (12). 
The estimated coefficients 12 1 , 122 , 123 as well as the .corrected R2 and the 
F-value of the least square estimations are documented in Table 4; results for 
computations with and without country- and industry-dummies are separately 
recorded. 
In both cases, the coefficient of the variable GOV indicating the difference 
between the two groups has a negative sign and differs significantly from zero. 
In the approach with country and industry dummies, the size of the corporation 
measured in terms of total assets is negatively correlated with the dependent 
variable. This means that the larger the corporation, the smaller the ratio of 
sales to employees. 
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Table 4. 
Results of the regressions for sales per employee as dependent variable 1975-84 
(standard deviation in brackets) 
GOV ASSET LEVER 
a1 a2 a3 R2 F n 
Model without - 54.53"'''' 1,6480 . 10- 6 43.17 0.01 5.10 1769 
country- and 
industry dummies (15.74) (1.2792 . 10- 6 ) (34.61) 
Model with -76.36** - 5.5738 . 10- 6 "'''' 94.68" 0.55 98.23 1769 
country- and 
industry dummies (11.84) (9.0533 . 10- 7) (30.49) 
.. Coefficients in the 2-tailed t-test significantly different from zero with a level of 
significance of at = 0.01 
Consideration of country and industry variables increases the value of R2 but 
does not influence significantly the coefficient of the GOV-variable. It can 
therefore be concluded that the lower ratio of SAL/E in large government-
owned corporations exists relatively independently of country and industry 
conditions. 
In a similar way the productivity measure "value of sales per $1 of assets" was 
explored in a multivariate approach: 
(2) 
where: 
SAL/A 
EMP 
SAL/A = ao + a1 GOV + a2 EMP + a3 LEVER 
5 14 
+ L bj NA1j+ L ckINDk + U 
j= 1 k= 1 
sales/total assets; 
employees; 
(for the other variables see above). 
Table 5 shows the results of this estimation. 
In this context, the coefficient that represents the difference between the two 
groups of large corporations (121) shows negative values that are significantly 
different from zero. The inclusion of industry and country variables partially 
reduces the influence of the ownership variable. However, the influence of 
ownership remains strongly significant. 
The hypothesis that privately-owned corporations show higher capital pro-
ductivity than government-owned corporations can be corroborated on the 
basis of these results. The size variable EMP exerts a negative influence on the 
dependent variable SAL/A. Thus capital productivity decreases as the number 
of employees increases. This implies that there are limits to firm growth. 
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Table 5. 
Estimated coefficients for the dependent variable sales/total assets 1975-84 
(standard deviations in brackets) 
GOV EMP LEVER 
0, O2 03 R2 F 
Model without - 0.3334** 1.2106· 10- 6 ** 0.4478** 0.05 33.12 
country- and 
industry dummies (0.0500) (2.9315 . 10- 7) (0.1150) 
Models with - 0.2266** - 1.9033 . 10-6 **0.7983** 0.26 29.13 
country- and 
industry dummies (0.0496) (2.9613 . 10- 7) (0.1363) 
n 
1773 
1773 
** Coefficient in the 2-tailed I-test significantly different from zero with a significance 
level of ex = o.ot 
For the test ofHZ similar multiple linear regression approaches were chosen: 
(3) 
(4) 
where: 
ROE 
ROA 
SALES 
ROE = ao + a1 GOV + a2 SALES + a2 LEVER 
5 14 
+ L bj NA'Ij + L Ck INDk + U 
j=1 k=1 
ROA = ao + a1 GOV + a2 SALES + a3 LEVER 
5 14 
+ L bj NA'Ij + L Ck INDk + U 
j= 1 k= 1 
Return on total stockholders equity; 
Return on total assets; 
total sales; 
(for the other variables see above). 
In this case, SALES was chosen as the size measure to avoid spurious corre-
lation between the independent and the dependent variables. Table 6 represents 
the main estimation results of this multivariate regression analysis. 
Both measures of profitability are greater in privately-owned corporations. 
The influence of country and industry variables on the differences in profitabil-
ity is rather weak. Government-owned corporations are throughout less prof-
itable, the size of the corporations playing a minor role as can be seen from 
estimated a2-coefficients. As can be seen from coefficient a 3 , a good equity 
endowment increases profitability in a significant way. Correlations between the 
ratio of stockholders equity to total assets and the dummy variable for govern-
ment/private ownership could play a role in this context. This will be investigat-
ed in the following section, thereby testing at the same time H3 which postulates 
that the ratio of shareholders' equity to total assets is lower in government-
owned corporations. 
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Table 6. 
Estimated coefficients of regressions for return on total stockholders' equity and 
on total assets as dependent variables 1975-84 (standard deviations in brackets) 
Dependent Variable: ROE 
GOV SALES LEVER 
a1 az a3 RZ F n 
Model without - 0.1723** 2.9471 . 10- 9 ** 0.3744** 0.10 67.06 1753 
country- and 
industry dummies (0.0186) (1.2848 . 10- 9 ) (0.0405) 
Model with - 0.1371 ** 3.8697 . to- 9 ** 0.3939** 0.18 18.03 1753 
country- and 
industry dummies (0.0199) (1.3160 . to- 9 ) (0.0506) 
Dependent variable: ROA 
Model without - 0.0368** 5.7924' 10- 1°* 0.1375 ** 0.23 173.12 1756 
country- and 
industry dummies (0.0084) (2.3354 . 10- 1 °) (0.0076) 
Model with - 0.0303** 8.1550 . 10- 1°** 0.1128 ** 0.31 37.20 1756 
country- and 
industry dummies (0.0035) (2.3576 . 10- 1°) (0.0097) 
** Coefficient in the 2-tailed t-test significantly different from zero with a significance 
level of et: = 0.01; * with a significance level of et: = 0.05 
Univariate results had shown that the equity endowment of privately-owned 
corporations is larger. This result must be investigated in more depth by mul-
tivariate methods. The approach contains ownership and industry variables, 
and sales is taken as the size variable. Results of the least squares estimation are 
shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. 
Estimated coefficients of regressions for total stockholders equity/total 
assets as dependent variable 1975-84 (standard deviation in brackets) 
GOV SALES 
a1 az R2 F 
Model without - 0.0733** 1.8415 . to- 9 0.03 31.11 
country-- and 
industry dummies (0.0102) (7.2146 . to- 1O) 
Model with - 0.0049 - 1.6177· to- 9 ** 0.45 71.51 
country- and 
industry dummies (0.0087) (5.7969· 10- 1°) 
n 
1791 
1791 
** Coefficient in the 2-tailed t-test significantly different from zero with a significance 
level of et: = O.ot 
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These results show that the two groups of ownership do not exert a significant 
influence on the endowment with equity if industry and country variables are 
taken into account. The respective coefficient d1 in the approach with country 
and industry dummies is negative but does not differ significantly from zero. 
The estimation shows a negative influence of the size variable (SALES) on the 
ratio of total stockholders equity to total assets. A comparison between the two 
approaches (with and without country and industry variables) shows that the 
equity endowment seems to be a country- and industry-specific phenomenon. 
The share of the explained variance of the dependent variable - expressed by R2 
- was less in the approach without industry and country variables (0.03) than 
in the approach with country and industry variables (0.45). This remarkable 
increase and the disappearing influence of the ownership variable show a rela-
tively high dependency of the ratio of equity to total assets on industry and 
country variables. H3 cannot be sustained with respect to these results. 
In order to prove H4 (size dependency of profits) the size measure EMP is 
chosen according to the contents of this hypothesis. The approach contains the 
net INCOME as dependent variable. In addition to the exogenous variables 
GOV, LEVER and EMP, this approach contains the interaction variable 
GOV . EMP whose coefficient a2 represents the difference between the two 
groups of an increase in profit arising from a larger number of employees. 18 
(5) INCOME = ao + a1 GOV + a2 GOV . EMP + a3 EMP 
5 14 
+ a4 LEV + L bj NA'1j + L Ck INDk + U 
j= 1 k= 1 
Table 8 shows that the estimation of the coefficient for this multiplicative 
variable is negative and significantly different from zero. The difference between 
the coefficients a3 and a2 is negative. This means that the profit in government-
owned corporations is negative related to the size measured by employees. This 
is more than was expected in H4: it is not merely that an increase in size leads 
to a smaller increase in profits in the case of government-owned corporations, 
but that this size increase leads as well to a profit decrease in government-owned 
corporations. This means that in these corporations greater problems of mon-
itoring exist due to higher numbers of employees, as was predicted in the theory. 
H4 is thereby empirically supported. 
18 a2 is defined as: 
d INCOMEG d INCOMEp 
a - -:-::::-:-::=--..:: 
2 - d EMP G d EMPp 
where the subscripts G = government-owned, and P = privately-owned. 
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Table 8. 
Estimated coefficients of regression for net income as dependent variable 
(standard deviation in brackets) 
GOV GOV EMP LEVER 
EMP 
al a2 a3 a4 R2 F 
Model with -7019 -1.5605** 1.1502 ** 217799** 0.27 28.69 
country- and 
industry 
dummies (17466) (0.1853) (0.0799) (31651) 
n 
1740 
** Coefficients in the 2-tailed t-test significantly different from zero with a level of 
significance of IX = 0.01 
5. Discussion 
On the basis of empirical data from Fortune's foreign 500 list, four hypotheses 
derived from property rights theory and competition theory of the firm were 
tested. Simple comparison of the ratios of the two groups (government-owned 
corporations and privately-owned corporations) showed significant differences 
with respect to productivity, profitability and the ratio of shareholders' equity 
to total assets. Government-owned corporations were throughout less prof-
itable and less productive; they showed a lower ratio of shareholders' equity to 
total assets. 
With the help of multivariate regression analysis, it was possible to control 
for several conditions, such as size of the corporations, country and industry 
variables. This approach corroborated the results for the productivity and 
profitability hypotheses (H1 and H2). However, H3 (lower ratio of shareholders' 
equity to total assets for government-owned corporations) could not be corrob-
orated as the financial structure of the firms was mainly influenced by industry 
and country specifics. The increase of profits depending on the number of 
employees (H4) was significantly less in government-owned companies than in 
privately-owned corporations, as is predicted by theory. 
It can be argued that differences in performance should be attributed mainly 
to speciallabor market-oriented objectives of government economic policy with 
the aid of government-owned corporations. However, our results cannot prove 
such an assumption. The results of the productivity of capital, a measure that 
does not contain the number of employees, are as significant as the results of 
other measures of efficiency. 
Furthermore, it could be claimed that the higher endowment of personnel in 
government-owned corporations would lead to higher capital investments (of-
fices, machinery etc.). However, especially in the sector of industrial manufactur-
ing and mining, these effects should be overcompensated by other trends. This 
means that a lower employment rate in privately-owned corporations would 
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lead to a relatively higher capital investment in these companies and that, on 
the other hand, capital investment in government-owned corporations should 
be lower because of the more labor-intensive production technologies used with 
respect to labor market objectives. If the differences in performance could be 
traced back solely to public employment policy, there should be no lower 
capital productivity in government-owned than in privately-owned corpora-
tions. However, we could find a significant higher input of employees and of 
capital in government-owned corporations, i.e. an overall lower productivity. 
Thus the proposition outlined at the beginning of this paper has been support-
ed: that is, disadvantages in performance of government-owned companies are 
mainly caused by the difference in the property rights structure. 
Future investigations should include additional possible determinants such 
as duration of government ownership, conditions of takeover by government 
(e.g. weak economic performance), intensity of competition in the respective 
industries, specific information about antitrust policy and government regula-
tion in the respective countries, as well as dynamic aspects (e.g. growth rates); 
the latter aspect, however, poses some empirical difficulties as the influence of 
varying exchange rates is an obstacle to a longitudinal study with comparison 
of different periods. 
To sum up, the preceeding investigation offers the following conclusions: 
1. The differences in performance between government-owned and privately-
owned large industrial corporations that property rights theory would predict 
are confirmed by empirical evidence, especially with respect to differences in 
productivity and profitability, but also with respect to size effects. 19 
2. On the basis of our measures of performance, the following implication 
may be drawn: nationalization of industrial corporations may lead to long-term 
efficiency disadvantages (from the perspective of the individual firm); privatiza-
tion is one option available to improve efficiency of government-owned enter-
prises. 
3. An increase in the size (in terms of number of employees) of government-
owned corporations leads to lower increases in profit than the same increase in 
the size of a private firm because larger agency problems (i.e. monitoring costs 
etc.) arise in government corporations. 
4. The findings can form the foundation for an economic policy offering a 
trade-off between corporate performance of different forms of ownership, on the 
one hand, and possible fulfillment of other goals through government-owned 
enterprises, on the other hand. However, according to our current knowledge, 
it is not at all clear whether and to what extent industrial corporations which 
are owned by government are able to fulfill additional goals in structural policy 
and labor market policy, and it is unclear how such consequences could be 
empirically measured. 
19 To that extent, this study complements the various existing empirical studies that 
test the property rights approach. See for reviews e.g. DE ALESSI [1980] and KAULMANN 
[1987 a]. 
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Summary 
As predicted by property rights theory, the empirical evidence presented in this 
article confirms that privately-owned large industrial corporations exhibit supe-
rior performance compared with their government-owned counterparts, espe-
cially with respect to productivity and profitability (even after accounting for 
size, industry and country effects). The database comprises Fortune's "The 
Foreign 500" for the years 1975-1984. The sample is drawn from six countries 
and fifteen industries, and it is exclusively confined to corporations that act in 
unregulated markets (i.e. state monopolies are excluded). The study uses uni-
variate and multivariate statistical techniques. 
ZusammenJassung 
Mit Hilfe der Theorie der Verfiigungsrechte und der Wettbewerbstheorie wird 
die Aussage abgeleitet, daB private industrielle GroBunternehmungen effizien-
ter als vergleichbare Unternehmungen in Staatseigentum arbeiten. Der vorlie-
gende Beitrag findet dieses Ergebnis besonders hinsichtlich der ProduktiviHiten 
und Rentabilitiiten empirisch bestiitigt. In der Untersuchung werden neben 
univariaten Vergleichen multivariate statistische Analysen durchgefiihrt, die 
den EinfluB der UnternehmungsgroBe sowie die Branchen- und Liinderzuge-
horigkeit kontrollieren. In der Stichprobe aus Fortune's "The Foreign 500" 
der lahre 1975-1984 sind keine staatlichen Monopole enthalten, sondern (ne-
ben Privatunternehmungen) nur solche industrielle GroBunternehmungen in 
Staatseigentum, die mit vergleichbaren privaten Unternehmungen im Wettbe-
werb stehen. 
Appendix f. 
Distribution of the sample by country according to ownership 1975-1984 
Country Government Private 
Great Britain 52 468 
Canada 5 211 
France 100 198 
Germany 30 505 
Italy 33 82 
Sweden 20 164 
Total 240 1628 
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Appendix 2. 
Distribution of the sample by industry according to ownership 1975-1984 
Industry Government Private 
Building materials 4 76 
Chemicals 12 187 
Electronics, appl. 7 193 
Ind., transportation equ. 7 171 
Metal products 9 144 
Metal man.-steel 41 155 
Mining nonferrous 8 27 
Mining coal 16 26 
Petroleum 37 243 
Tobacco 9 56 
Shipbuilding 13 6 
Office equipment, computer 3 76 
Motor vehicles 25 209 
Metal man., aluminium 13 20 
Aerospace 36 39 
Total 240 1628 
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